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ABSTRACT 
In this paper an electromagnetic side-channel attack on a commercial AES-256 USB-
encryption module operating in ECB mode is introduced. In preparation for the 
attack, oscilloscope, electromagnetic probe with low-noise amplifier and isolated 
power supply were used together with computer to record 10000 plaintext 
encryptions. The attack was conducted with the collected plaintext-ciphertext pairs 
and EM traces corresponding to each encryption. The attack was con-ducted with 
Correlation Power Analysis method and Matlab software. The power consumption 
(and thus the EM emission) of the device was modeled using hamming distance 
metric.  
The correlation between modeled power consumption and measured traces 
allowed the extraction of AES round keys one byte at a time. For AES-256 last two 
round keys (rounds 13 and 14) were needed to complete the key schedule. Finding 
these two keys allowed to calculate the original secret key from which they were 
expanded. For successful attack several trials were required to find right 
measurement setup for oscilloscope and electromagnetic head position. In this attack 
30 out of the 32 round key bytes were found using side-channel attack and the two 
remaining were found using brute force. The device was found to have some kind of 
backdoor mechanism. 
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In cryptography, a side-channel attack (SCA) is any attack based on information 
gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem, rather than brute force 
or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms. For example, electromagnetic leaks can 
provide an extra source of information, which can be exploited to break the system 
[1]. Fault-injection and most side-channel attacks require direct access or contact to 
the device under attack. Such side-channel attacks include power [2] and temperature 
[3] analysis or cache-based [4] attacks. However, all architectures and code run on 
the system leak EM side-channel information due to the physical structure of 
integrated circuits [5] and this has been exploited in side-channel attacks previously 
[6]. 
The commercial SCA tools are expensive, to a degree that excludes their use in 
this context. These commercial attack tools are made for the industry for example by 
Rambus [7] and Riscure [8]. SAKURA circuit boards [9] have also been used often 
in an academic study, but they do not offer tools to proprietary circuit boards. On 
NEWAE Chipwhisperer [10] the clock of the circuit board can be synchronised with 
the attack device which reduces the synchronising need for the measurings 
afterwards. However, this requires a specific interface to the circuit boards. Another 
requirement is controlling the proprietary software of the commercial device 
automatically during the attack. Typically the commercial de-vices do not contain a 
standardised interface, excluding the so-called smart cards. This means that it is 
difficult to use above SCA-tools with commercial devices and the custom SCA tools 
have to be built. 
The aim was to crack a commercial hardware AES-256 ECB encryption device. 
The method used to perform the attack was electromagnetic side-channel attack. The 
target was to find the AES-256 secret key. It was unknown if there were any 
countermeasures on the device. The security of a commercial device was tested 
against side-channel attack and our own SCA-tools were developed at the same time. 
Addonics CipherUSB AES-256 ECB device was selected as a target, illustrated 
in Figure 1. The device is connected between a PC and USB memory. It is possible 
to encrypt or decrypt data with the device to the USB-memory or the network. 
Introduction 
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The analysis of the device was started with physical observations and the 
supplied specification was read. After removing the shielding, the encryption chip 
and the power supply lines of the device were identified. The encryption chip of 
another copy of the device was cut open and inspected under a microscope in order 
to gain insight of the target areas for EM leakage. The device operation was tested 
and USB traffic was analysed. Operating the device was dependent on proprietary 
software supplied by vendor which restricted our examination. 
The analysis identified that the data includes a header and a payload. The payload 
includes several 16 bytes AES blocks. Each AES block position in the payload was 
found by using special encrypted files. 
The device also appears to have some form of a backdoor mechanism in the data 
header. The header data structure is introduced in Section 2. While uncovering the 
back-door is out of the scope of this research, it is an interesting target for the further 
examination. 
Correlation power analysis (CPA) [1] was used as a statistical attack method. In 
this attack Matlab was used to perform CPA over the acquired measurements. The 
power consumption (and thus the EM emission) of the device was modelled using 
hamming distance metric. 
SikuliX machine vision software [11] controls the device proprietary software 
and NEWAE EM voltage probe [12] was selected for EM measurements (Figure 1).  
The research showed that CipherUSB, which is on commercial use, is vulnerable 
to side-channel analysis, and side-channel protection to the device is needed. 
This paper is organised as follows: In Section I, a brief introduction and target is 
given, continued with analysis of the target device in Section II. This is followed 
how the traces were recorded in Section III and how correlation power analysis was 
used to perform the attack in Section IV. And finally conclusions are drawn in 
Section V. 
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Figure 1. Performing electromagnetic side-channel attack on a commercial AES-256 device 
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2 Analyzing the Target Device 
The encrypted files were inspected with a hex editor using different inputs and 
encryption keys supplied to the device. Files were modified in encrypted form and 
then fed back to the CipherUSB for decryption. Using this method, significant 
sections of the file structure used by the device were identified. The device creates 
512-byte header data followed by the actual encrypted data (payload) as seen in 
Figure 2. The two unknown fields in the Figure 2 appeared to change randomly and 
they could be overwritten by arbitrary data without impairing the functionality of the 
program or correctness of the decryption. They most likely contain metadata related 
to the encrypted data such as date and time or some user data. While the payload is 
the most relevant field in the scope of this article, the header was also analysed in 
more detail. 
Any modification to the first 32 bytes of the file cause the program to output 
“Incorrect recovery password.” error. Modifying other parts of the file shows either 
“Data may have been modified or altered. Aborting decryption process.” error, or 
no error message at all. The first 32 bytes could correspond to the bytes of an AES-
256 key after some transformation. The first 16 bytes of this field changed only if 
the key used by the device was changed. The latter 16 bytes seem to be changing 
randomly between encryptions. Recovery key is followed by device model, 
assumed serial number and some other metadata encoded in ASCII. After device 
info there is a short segment that contains the length of the payload. Following the 
length of payload there is a short unknown segment. Modifying this part of the file 
does not seem to affect anything in the functionality. It might contain encryption 
time and date. There is a short 4 byte field after the short unknown field which is 
assumed to be a 32-bit checksum. Peculiarly setting all bytes to the same value for 
each block sets this field to zero. Following the checksum there is another, this 
time longer, unknown field. This is the last field of the header before the encrypted 
data. Finding the location of the payload was straightforward just by looking at 
which part of the file stays the same when data stays the same and matches the 
length of the input data. 
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Figure 2.  Data fields found in header. Real values overwritten for clarity. 
Presence of ECB-mode was verified by encrypting a large bitmap picture. 
Encrypted bytes of the picture were extracted from the resulting file by stripping the 
header (first 512 bytes). Bitmap header was then added to the encrypted data and 
encrypted and unencrypted image were compared with image viewing program. 
Outline of the original image was clearly visible in the encrypted file as the ECB-
mode does not hide large recurring patterns in the data [13]. 
The file size of the plaintext was found to affect the amount of bursts of EM 
leakage measured as expected. By trying varying sizes of files it was concluded that 
each burst corresponded to 512 bytes of data. The AES encryption has a block size 
of 16 bytes. It follows that there must be 32 block encryption events within a single 
EM-burst. Positions of the block encryption events were identified by feeding the 
device specially crafted files sized 512 bytes corresponding to the assumed buffer 
size. The data bits of the targeted encryption block were set to ’1’, while all other 
encryption blocks (31) data bits in the file were set to ’0’. Multiple encryptions were 
performed using the same data and the resulting EM traces were averaged. After 
around 200 traces the position of the targeted block encryption event started to 
emerge. Figure 3 showcases the dampening of the amplitude and stronger low peak 
in the encryption block under testing. Same test was conducted for all block 
encryption events by moving the position of ’1’ block in the input data. Moving the 
Analyzing the Target Device 
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’1’ block in the data caused the dampening and low peak to move in the trace 
correspondingly. 
According the user manual, the device is using two-factor authentication. Two-
factor authentication provides an additional layer of security and makes it harder for 
attackers to gain access to files. The password is one factor, something the user 
knows. The device is second factor, something the user has. Encryption or decryption 
should not be possible without having both of these, the password and the device. If 
for some reason the device is lost, encrypted files are not lost because new device 
can be programmed using the pass-word. There is only one password and it is used 
to open the device and changing the password. 
 
Figure 3.  Setting all bits to ’1’ causes the block encryption to differ from surrounding block 
encryptions. Block encryption 16 out of 32. 
This kind of method, that only one password is used, allows several users en-
crypt/decrypt files easily if they are just using the same password and own separate 
de-vices. It is therefore concluded, that the device does not actually use two-factor 
authentica-tion. That is because any device of the same model family, programmed 
with the same password, can decrypt and encrypt for an unlimited amount of time. 
There should be an-other password like system administrator password that would 
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set the AES-256 key of the device. Then it would be two-factor authentication 
device. Also, there is no way to restore or reset the device. If the password is lost, 
the device cannot be used anymore. 
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3 Recording Traces 
Before you begin to format your paper, first write and save the content as a separate 
text file. Complete all content and organizational editing before formatting. Please 
note sections A-D below for more information on proofreading, spelling and 
grammar. 
SCA attack tools selected were SikuliX machine vision software which controls 
the device proprietary software, Keysight DSO-S 054A oscilloscope with a voltage 
probe and a planar H-field EM-probe combined with a low-noise amplifier and 
isolated power supply by NewAE, a PC and .NET based controller for the 
oscilloscope (Figure 1) running on the PC. 
3.1 Oscilloscope settings and probe position 
Running an encryption task of the device caused a voltage drop in the power supply 
line. The oscilloscope was triggered from the device power supply line. This 
improved the stability of the EM-leakage signal, compared to triggering directly 
from the EM-signal. 
After experimenting with different oscilloscope settings, it was observed that if 
the probe positioning is accurate enough, then a 500 MHz sample rate is enough. 
This re-quires that automatic interpolation setting is turned on to help the alignment 
of traces. While the strongest point of leakage would seem a natural place to measure 
the traces, in-stead, the optimal place was on the other side of the chip of the strongest 
leakage point. The traces on the strongest leakage point and the best leakage point 
were not distinguish-able to the eyes other than by amplitude. However, the round 
positions in the correct leakage point were visible to the eyes using special fixed 
plaintexts and averaging. 
A 200 MHz low-pass filter in the oscilloscope was mainly used to pre-process 
the EM-probe signal. Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows 5000 MSa/s sampling rate sine 
waves when 200 MHz filter is off and on. Distortion can be seen clearly on signal if 
low-pass filter is not in use. Applying the low-pass filtering also to the trigger signal 
improved the accuracy and reduced false trigger events. A small section of the trace 
gave the best CPA attack results. The first few block encryption events of the traces 
leaked less than the others. How-ever, it was possible to extract they key from the 
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device by using only to the first 4 block encryption events i.e. to the beginning of the 
trace. 
Typically, whole 512 bytes file (payload) was recorded, meaning 32 pcs of 16 
byte encryptions. Occasionally shorter traces were recorded for increased resolution. 
For the test a set of 10000 plaintext and 20000 traces was done and the results gave 
several AES round keys from at least three corners of the chip. The EM-probe is 
rather big compared to the cryptographic chip of the device, which might be the 
reason for the result. In the future, it would be better to use a smaller millimeter level 
EM-probe. 
One data burst payload takes about 9 microseconds and consists of 32 
encryptions of 16 byte blocks. One encryption takes 9/32 microseconds i.e. 0.28 
microseconds. One AES-256 encryption has 14 rounds [14], so each round would 
take 0.28/14 microseconds i.e. 20 nanoseconds. It means that at least 100 MHz 
sampling frequency should be used with the device, according the Nyqvist theorem 
[15]. 
The interpolation setting in the oscilloscope improved the accuracy of the attack 
remarkably. Without interpolation it was impossible to find any or just few of the 
key bytes from a trace set. With interpolation enabled all of the key bytes were 
uncovered. The interpolation smooths the recorded traces reducing the jitter of signal 
peaks, allowing more accurate correlation calculations [16]. 
The oscilloscope settings play a pivotal role to get adequate results. First the 
signal was measured using normal 8 bit resolution without automatic interpolation, 
using quite high sampling rate up to 2.0 GHz. After changing the settings to 13-bit 
resolution and automatic interpolation the results improved significantly, even in the 
lower sampling rates. Typical recording speed was 1.25 GSa/s. Much higher 
recording speeds up to 5 GSa/s were also investigated so that automatic interpolation 





Figures 6 and 7, and Figures 8 and 9 show 1.25 GSa/s sine wave heads before 
and after alignment when interpolation is either off- or on-position. The shape of the 
signal is rather angular when interpolation is off in addition to which there are 
outliers. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show 5.0GSa/s sampling rate measurements when 
interpolation is off-position, not aligned and aligned signal. 
 
  
Figure 4.  200MHz filter OFF, unaligned 
signals 
Figure 5. 200MHz filter ON, unaligned signals 
Figure 6.  1.25 GSa/s rec. speed and 
interpolation OFF, unaligned. 
Figure 7.  1.25 GSa/s rec. speed and 
interpolation OFF, aligned. 




3.2 Recording process 
The device under attack was dependent on the supplied proprietary software 
featuring a GUI, which hindered the ability to record thousands of traces usually 
needed for side-channel attacks. The GUI issue was bypassed by creating Python bot 
leveraging ma-chine vision functions provided by SikuliX. The bot was then used to 
handle the repetitive operation of the GUI. The bot was coupled with the oscilloscope 
control program written in C# via local sockets. Oscilloscope control program took 
care of arming the oscilloscope and storing the recorded data to the disk. Some error 
recovery capabilities were also added as the synchronization between the bot and 
Figure 8.  1.25 GSa/s rec. speed and 
interpolation ON, unaligned 
Figure 9.  1.25 GSa/s rec. speed and 
interpolation ON, aligned. 
Figure 10.  5.0 GSa/s rec. speed and 
interpolation OFF, unaligned. 
Figure 11.  5.0 GSa/s rec. speed and 
interpolation OFF, aligned 
Recording Traces 
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oscilloscope controller enabled more reliable operation and recovery from trigger 
glitches. This setup allowed the encryption of arbitrary amounts of plaintexts and 
recording of corresponding EM-traces. The speed of operation was mostly limited 
by the response time of the GUI. The data files were placed in hierarchical folder 
structure to avoid unnecessary scrolling in the GUI, which increased the speed of the 
process. 
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4 Correlation Power Analysis 
The device under attack was running an implementation of AES encryption stand-
ard. AES specifies 128-, 192- and 256-byte key lengths and 10, 12 and 14 rounds of 
operation respectively, with fixed block size of 16 bytes. Each round has an 
associated round key derived from the original key input for the algorithm. The AES 
encryption process applies four core operations to the data consecutively each round 
with exceptions in the first and last round. The core operations are SubBytes, 
ShiftRows, MixColumns and Ad-dRoundKey. The operations are applied to 4x4 
matrix formed from the input data called state. SubBytes is a substitution operation 
where the input bytes are replaced using special substitution table. ShiftRows shifts 
the rows 2, 3 and 4 of the matrix by 1, 2, 3 positions respectively. MixColumns 
performs matrix multiplication with predefined matrix and state in Galois field of 
two elements. AddRoundKey is just a XOR operation of the state and the key. 
In this study Matlab was used to perform the CPA over the acquired 
measurements. First the EM-measurements were aligned. Simple alignment method 
was used to synchronize first spike exceeding the threshold. The power consumption 
of the device was modeled using hamming distance metric. Finding correlation 
between modeled power consumption and measured traces allows extracting the 
AES round keys one byte at a time. For AES-256 two last (rounds 13 and 14) round 
keys are needed to complete the key schedule. Finding the two round keys therefore 
allows calculation of the full secret key. More details on the most important steps in 
the attack are described in the following sub-sections. The attack duration could be 
reduced using other programming languages but is not within the scope of this paper. 
For a successful attack several measurements were required to find right 
measurement setup for oscilloscope and a good position for the EM-probe. In the 
attack 30 out of the 32 round key bytes were found using side-channel attack and the 
two remaining were found using brute force. The complexity of using brute force 
increases exponentially with the number of unknown bytes. Therefore finding more 
than a few bytes becomes computationally too expensive with the brute force 
method. The recovered secret key was verified by decrypting some of the 
ciphertexts. 
Correlation Power Analysis 
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4.1 Alignment 
The traces needed to be aligned due to trigger-signal jitter. A simple alignment 
method was used to synchronize the first spike over a threshold. It was found that 
around 60% of maximum signal amplitude gave good results. A Matlab script was 
used to find the earliest trace in the set and shift other traces accordingly. 
4.2 Attack to round 14 
Once the measured traces are aligned, the last round key can be attacked. The 
operation is similar to the attack on AES128, in which obtaining last round key is 
sufficient to extract the secret key. The attack point used here is at the input of S-
box. The difference of the last AES encryption round to the previous rounds is the 
lack of MixColumns operation, which simplifies the attack. With known ciphertext, 
the bytes at this point for all possible key-byte values (guesses) can be calculated by 
performing the AES-encryption algorithm steps in reverse order. The modelled 
power consumption (hypothesis) is evaluated using hamming distance model, where 
the assumption is that changes in bit value has an effect on the emitted power. 
Finding the correlation between the calculated hypotheses and measured traces 
allows us to evaluate which key byte guesses provide most significant correlation to 
the measurements, thus serving as key byte candidates. An example of correlation 
for one key byte is shown in Figure 12. Correlation peak is visible for byte value 28, 
which is a strong candidate for round key byte value. 
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Figure 12. Correlation of different byte values for one round 14 key byte 
4.3 Attack to round 13 
With the help of the found round 14 key, hypothesis can be calculated further to the 
input of the S-box in the 13th round. The main difference in the implementation of 
the 13th round as compared to 14th is the presence of MixColumns function. At first, 
it would seem that it is not possible to perform the attack byte-by-byte. Luckily, mix-
columns is a linear function allowing the separation of the calculation of the 
hypothesis by using pseudokey [17]. The state at the end of round 13 is 
 X13 = SubBytes−(ShiftRows−(MixColumns−(X14⊕K13))) (1) 
where X14 is the state at the output of round 14 and K13 the 13th round key. As 
MixColums is linear function i.e. 
 MixColumns(A+B) =MixColumns(A)+MixColumns(B) (2) 
a pseudokey can be defined as 
 K’13 = ShiftRows−(MixColumns−(K13)) (3) 
 X13 = SubBytes−(ShiftRows−(MixColumns−(X14))⊕K13) (4) 
Using this similar attack as for the 14th round can be performed. Once all bytes 
of the pseudokey are found, it can be transformed back to the real round 13 key: 
 K13 = MixColumns(ShiftRows(K’13) (5,6,7) 
Correlation Power Analysis 
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4.4 Reverse key schedule 
Once both 13th and 14th round keys are found, reverse key schedule can be 
calculated and the original 256-bit secret key obtained. If all byte values are not 
found, brute force approach can be applied for the uncertain bytes. Using brute force 
requires calculation of reverse key schedule and decryption attempt for all 





Commercial devices are vulnerable to EM side-channel attacks, even when using 
relatively low cost equipment, in the order of a few thousand Euros. Addonics 
CipherUSB-device secret key was found in the EM side-channel attack. Using ECB-
mode in modern encryption device is a big liability due to weakness of it. The method 
used to un-cover the positions of the block encryption events could not be used 
against a device using any pattern hiding mode. All of the encrypted data was 
decryptable using a computer. Additional data block was also found which might 
allow decryption without the device, and the header data might include backdoor 
mechanism.  
Side-channel attack might fail if there are not enough traces, we measured up to 
10000 plaintexts, which can be done overnight. For a successful attack several 
measurements were required. Actual attack and analysis took then few hours. Attack 
might fail also if the power model does not match to actual power consumption or 
using wrong intermediate values. Incorrect oscilloscope setup or EM-probe 
positioning could hinder the attack as well. There might also be countermeasures 
against attacks in a device.  
The information leaked in the form of EM emissions enabled the side-channel to 
find the secret key significantly faster than would have been possible with 
(impractical) brute-force attack. In consequence, implementations have to be 
evaluated for their resistivity against such attacks and the incorporation of different 
countermeasures has to be considered. 
CipherUSB supports not only ECB mode, but also CBC mode, and is widely 
used, with only price differences. In order to show the vulnerability of CipherUSB, 
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